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The Rise of Neo-Nationalism and the Front National in France 3 
 When the FN was founded in the early 1970s it was widely irrelevant. However, 
over the past three decades, it has managed to enter into and reshape mainstream 
French politics. Historically, economic, social, and political transformations have aided 
the party in their popularization. This paper looks at how similar economic, political and 
social transformations in the 21st century have enabled this neo-nationalist party to gain 
such unprecedented electoral success. More precisely, this paper looks at how these 
factors, identified as the 2008-09 Global Economic crisis, changing immigration trends, 
and the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, have all interacted and 
intersected to create a favorable climate for the rise of the FN by promoting fear and 
crisis.  
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 Starting in the 2010s, the world began to see a resurgence of nationalism, 
indicated by a spike in popularity for parties rooted in this “new nationalism”, such as the 
Sweden Democrats, the National Restoration Party in Costa Rica, or the One Nation 
Party of Australia. A party that exemplifies this trend is the French political party the 
Front National (FN), often cited as the principal neo-nationalist party from which others 
have since been modeled after (Hauwaert, 2019). 
 When the FN was founded in the early 1970s it was widely irrelevant. Yet, over 
the past three decades, it has managed to reshape mainstream French politics, making 
its first real breakthrough at the national level in 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen, its 
founder and leader, made it to the second round of the presidential election. However, it 
was unable to achieve the same success in the 2007 presidential election. The party 
seemed to be deteriorating as a result of various scandals and xenophobic/racist 
comments revolving around Jean-Maria Le Pen, destroying both its public image as well 
as alienating it from politics. However, in 2011, Le Pen’s daughter, Marine, became the 
leader of the party, marking the beginning of a revival for the FN. This paper aims to 
identify and understand the reasons for this revival.  
 Historically, economic, social, and political transformations have aided the party 
in their popularization. This paper looks to identity how similar transformations occurring 
in the 21st century have continued to aid the FN. It aims to suggest that it is through their 
intersections and interactions that these contemporary economic, social, and political 
transformations– specifically the 2008-09 Economic Recession, changing immigration 
trends, and the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande – have created a 
favorable climate for the Front National by promoting fear and crisis.  
Historical Context: The Rise of the Front National  
 The FN was founded in 1972 by François Brigneau, François Duprat, Alain 
Robert, and most notably Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was chosen to be the first president 
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of the party (Stockemer, 2017). The FN strove to present itself as a populist, anti-
communist, xenophobic movement that surpassed traditional conceptions of left and 
right (Davies, 1999). “It advocated for the shrinking of the public sector, the minimization 
of state intervention, drastic and restrictive changes to immigration policy…and the 
usage of proportional representation voting system in all elections” (Stockemer, 2017, 
p.11). For the initial 10 years following the FN’s creation, it operated on the fringes of the 
political sphere, being ignored by mainstream politics. Internally, the FN was 
unsuccessful at building a cohesive platform that satisfied moderate to extremist 
supporters leading to the party’s poor performance1 (Stockemer, 2017).  
 During the 1980s the FN began making electoral gains. Most notably, in the 1984 
European Parliament elections, the FN won 11% of the votes, giving them 10 seats in 
the European Parliament (France Politique, 2015). Two years later in 1986, the FN won 
35 seats in the Assemblée Nationale (France Politique, 2015). In 1988 the party and 
Jean-Marie Le Pen won 14.38% of the vote in the presidential election (France Politique, 
2015). This unexpected progress made by the FN is linked to social, economic, and 
political transformations that occurred in France during the early 1980s, which the party 
exploited in order to legitimize and develop their platform (Stockemer, 2017). First, many 
voters were unhappy with the economic state of France. The country had experienced 
an economic crisis in the late 1970s, early 1980s, which resulted in rising unemployment 
and diminished economic growth. President Mitterrand sought to implement neo-
Keynesian economic policy in order to counteract economic turmoil. Yet, unemployment 
only increased (Stockemer, 2017). Second, immigration became a more pertinent issue 
in France due to Mitterrand’s easing of immigration policy/regulation as well as the 
increased number of North African immigrants in France (Stockemer, 2017). These 
                                                        
1 In the 1973 legislative election, the FN only received 1.32% of the votes (108,000 votes) 
(Stockemer, 2017). 
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changes began raising fears about increased “ghettoization” and high crime/delinquency 
rates in social housing projects as a result of these populations (Stockemer, 2017). 
Lastly, in 1985, President Mitterrand changed the French electoral system from plurality 
to a party-list proportional representation voting system. (Miller,1986). However, this also 
made it easier for smaller parties to win seats in legislative bodies, explaining the FN’s 
electoral success in the 1986 legislative election2.  
 The FN exploited these developments by reshaping their political platform to 
center on immigration and security (Stockemer, 2017). It exploited the changing 
immigration trends and economic instability of France in order to advance xenophobic 
and authoritarian sentiments in French politics, promoting that there was a connection 
between the increase in non-European immigrants and the rise of crime and 
unemployment in France. Additionally, Le Pen began upholding a more populist 
message that could attract a wider audience and address the growing lack of confidence 
in the established political system, regarding its ability to address key voter issues 
(Stockemer, 2017). The party used populism both as a means to differentiate itself from 
mainstream parties and to present itself as the alternative to the French political system 
(Stockemer, 2017). Their new language stressed a discourse promoting “exclusionary 
conceptions of community” that countered multiculturalism and inclusion (Stockemer, 
2017, p. 15). Le Pen emphasized the idea that power needed to be returned to the 
French people and that populist free-market capitalism was the best way to achieve this. 
 The 1990s were a period of electoral success as well as crisis for the FN. 
Despite internal turmoil in the 1980s and early 1990s, the final decade of the 20th century 
offered the FN a pinnacle time for development. Bruno Mégret became the general 
director of the party and significantly modified its rhetoric, disguising the party’s 
                                                        
2 Following this election France reverted back to a plurality voting system for legislative elections. 
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xenophobia by reformulating it into the notion of préférence nationale3 (Stockemer, 
2017). Additionally, during this period, globalization became an important issue in 
French national politics, in part as a result of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty4 in 
1992. In response to this, the FN began transitioning towards economic protectionism 
and criticizing neo-liberalism, arguing that the government’s commitment to global free 
trade was the reason the economy was declining (Bastow, 1997). Globalization was also 
incorporated in the party’s populist rhetoric. “It modified its divisive ‘us/them’ discourse to 
include new political “enemies” such as elites from the European Union and other 
supranational organizations” (Stockemer, 2017, p. 20). These changes seemed to 
further their popularity. In 1993 the party won 12.7% of the votes in the parliamentary 
election and 14.9% five years later (NSD, n.d.). In 1995, Le Pen captured 15% of the 
votes in the presidential election, a record percentage for the party at the time (NSD, 
n.d).  
 Through the 1980s and 1990s, the FN integrated its economic and political 
concerns into the French mainstream political agenda, forcing other political parties to 
engage with these topics (Davies, 1999). Many parties began appropriating elements of 
Le Pen’s anti-immigration rhetoric as a strategy to advance their own political agendas. 
However, this backfired and worked to the advantage of the FN by giving credibility to its 
rhetoric (Stockemer, 2017, p. 21). The unforeseen progression of the FN into 
mainstream politics became visible in the 2002 presidential election, during which Le 
Pen became the first leader of a nationalist party to qualify to the second round of voting 
in France (Stockemer, 2017).5  
                                                        
3 Translation: national preference  
4 The Maastricht Treaty founded the European Union, established its structure, and eventually 
lead to the creation of the Euro.  
5 In the first round, Le Pen won 16.86% of votes, taking second place and beating the PS 
candidate Lionel Jospin (NSD, n.d.). In the second round of voting, the Le Pen was able to attain 
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 By the 2002 presidential election, the FN was vulnerable, still recovering from the 
loss of at least half of its electorate and executives due to the expulsion of Mégret from 
the party (Stockemer, 2017). Another significant reason for the party’s subsequent 
decline was that the 2002 election sparked anti-FN mobilization6. The defeated PS 
candidate Lionel Jospin called for voters to unite, regardless of political affiliations, and 
vote for Chirac in order to block Le Pen from winning (Stockemer, 2017).  French media 
outlets largely denounced the FN as a nationalist threat, tarnishing the credibility of the 
party as well as shrinking its electorate. This scandal caused long-term damage to the 
party and its electoral success,7 signifying that the FN may be on its way out of the 
political scene.  
 However, since Marine Le Pen took her father’s place as leader of the FN in 
2011, the party has experienced a ‘revival’. This revival is exemplified by the 2017 
presidential election in which Le Pen made it to the second round of voting. While Le 
Pen did not win this election, it is important to realize this was only the second time that 
the FN had made it to the second round of voting in a French presidential election. Yet, 
this time, Marine Le Pen won twice as many votes in the second round as her father did 
in 2002. 8 
 In general, there are very few differences between the ideology of the “old” FN of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen and that of the “new” FN of Marine Le Pen. Despite her 
dédiabolization9 campaign to repair the image of the party, the Front National continues 
to focus on the concepts of nation and identity (Davies, 1999). The party has always 
                                                                                                                                                                     
17.8% of the votes, resulting in his opponent Jacques Chirac becoming the next president of 
France (NSD, n.d.).  
6 Beginning between the first and second rounds of voting 
7 In 2002 the FN won 11.12% of the vote in the parliamentary election, however, in 2007 the party 
only acquired 4.29% (NSD, n.d.). Two years later in 2009, the FN went from having 7 seats in the 
European Parliament to having 3 (winning 6.3% of votes in that year’s election) (NSD, n.d.). 
8 Marine Le Pen won 10 million votes in the second round of voting (NSD, n.d.).  
9 Translation: de-demonization 
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held a nationalist ideology focused on preserving French national identity, society and 
culture (Davies, 1999). With this ideology, the party perceives (and portrays) the French 
nation as a weak and vulnerable. Thus, increasing non-European populations in France 
are understood ‘external’ elements’ that threaten the state, and therefore the French 
identity and way of life. As a result of this perceived threat, the FN operates as the self-
proclaimed ‘protector’ of France promoting an agenda of law-and-order political 
platforms, welfare chauvinism, economic protectionism, Euroscepticism, and opposition 
to immigration, particularly of Muslim immigrants (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017).  
 One area of change, however, is that Marine Le Pen has significantly reshaped 
the party’s discourse to minimize the party’s infamous xenophobic messages and 
replace it with a more populist rhetoric.  While the party under Jean-Marie Le Pen was 
also characterized as populist, it was rather the radical element that prevailed, typically 
manifested in racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic comments (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). 
This transition is particularly evident with the framing of the FN’s message. The FN of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen was based on anti-immigration sentiments, viewing immigration as 
the most important problem and thus basing all other policy through an anti-immigration 
lens (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). However, under Marine Le Pen, “the FN’s anti-
immigration platform is no longer presented as an end in itself but rather as part of a 
holistic solution” to the main concerns of the general French public (Stockemer & 
Barisione, 2017, p.107). In this way, her emphasis on populism can be perceived as an 
attempt to simultaneously dismiss the party’s racist origins, conceal the fact that the 
party maintains the same ideology, and appeal to a wider audience in order to gain more 
support and remain in mainstream politics. 
 However, a shift in discourse alone cannot explain the party’s recent popularity. 
By examining the history of Front National, starting out as an irrelevant extremist group 
in the 1970s and evolving into the political contender it is today, the party’s expansion 
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becomes evident. Yet it also becomes clear that the ideology and message of the party 
has remained the same. Rather, the party’s strategy and rhetoric has continued to 
develop in order to capitalize on the varying social, political, and economic 
circumstances that have occurred in France over the past three decades. Marine Le 
Pen’s recent changing of the name of the party from le Front National to le 
Rassemblement National is more so indicative of a strategy to distance and disassociate 
the party from its fascist roots, rather than an actual change in the party’s ideology.10  
Methodology 
 I am approaching my analysis of the Front National (FN) as an important case 
study of how and why neo-nationalism and its supporters have gained political power 
and popularity since 2007, as following this year the FN began to preform better in 
elections. While there are other neo-nationalist figures, such as US President Donald 
Trump and the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, relevant to the evolution of neo-
nationalism, the FN is considered one of the oldest and main developers of this new 
form of nationalism.  The party epitomizes neo-nationalism in that it does not operate 
through an adherence to right- or left-wing politics; rather, it operates on a basis of 
promoting and defending the nation and national identity. The party’s political platform 
exemplifies the characteristics commonly associated with this new form of nationalism, 
such as protectionism, nativism, Eurosceptism, opposition to immigration, and 
Islamophobia.   
 This study’s focus point is on political power and influence, which is measured 
using quantitative data, expressed as electoral results. Moreover, these concepts are 
                                                        
10 Rassemblement has historically been affiliated with traditional right parties, while Front has 
been associated with radical parties (on either side of the political spectrum). This paper makes 
the strategic choice to continue to refer to the party as le Front National. In doing so, this paper 
asserts that the “new” party of Marine Le Pen and the “old” party of Jean-Marie Le Pen are 
essentially the same and seeks to ensure that this rebranding does dissimulate the racist and 
xenophobic ideology (or history) of the party.   
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then explored through demographic, economic, and political trends in order to determine 
how these facets of society can collectively strengthen political power and influence.  
 Lastly, this study is secondary research done by other researchers, as I am 
unable to travel to France to collect my own data. I gathered my information from 
scholarly articles, departmental statistics of France (such as election results and 
unemployment rates by department) taken from French government pages and the 
World Bank, as well as news articles.  
Literature Review: Defining Neo-Nationalism  
 Marcus Banks and Andre Gingrich (2006) define neo-nationalism as a social 
phenomenon characterized by the re-emergence of nationalism within a different global 
and transnational context. This context emerged following the end of the Cold War and 
can ultimately be understood as the growing presence of globalization and transnational 
issues (Banks & Marcus, 2006). While they find that there are basic characteristics of 
earlier variants of nationalism that still apply to neo-nationalism as they all claim to 
uphold eternal values, defend timeless aspirations, and work towards a continuous 
invention of tradition (Banks & Gingrich, 2006). Banks and Gingrich determine that the 
defining characteristic of neo-nationalism is that it is essentially an oppositional response 
to the realities and exchanges that result from living in a globalized world. This is 
reflected in neo-nationalist fundamental values such as oppositional attitudes towards 
immigration, Islam and Muslim populations, social welfare programs, and the EU, as well 
as in their populist/anti-establishment rhetoric (Banks & Marcus, 2006).  
 Additionally, Banks and Gingrich address how changes regarding supporter 
demographics have reoriented the message of neo-nationalists. The rural base for 
nationalists has been steadily shrinking, due to rural to urban migration as well as 
urbanization in Europe. Moreover, the diversity that exists within urban settings has 
forced many neo-nationalist leaders to deviate from traditional nationalist conceptions of 
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cultural uniformity (Banks & Gingrich, 2006). Neo-nationalists have put a new emphasis 
on ‘assimilation’ or ‘separation’ as a means of trying to reestablish this homogeneity 
(Banks & Gingrich, 2006). Therefore, Banks and Gingrich argue that as a result of 
changing global context and trends, neo-nationalists have had to adapt and therefore 
adjust the way in which they promote their political agenda in order to remain relevant 
and gain support.    
 Maureen Eger and Sarah Valdez (2015) use the Manifesto Project Dataset, 
which is based on content analyses of parties’ election programs in over 50 countries 
since 1945, to survey what issues parties prioritize in order to determine how radical 
right parties have changed overtime. Eger and Valdez determine that contemporary 
radical right parties are better characterized as ‘neo-nationalist’ (rather than far, extreme, 
or radical right) due to the context these parties emerged in as well as the changes their 
political platforms.  
 According to Eger and Valdez, neo-nationalist parties are working within the 
confines of consolidated nation states, unlike the previous contexts in which earlier 
forms of nationalism prevailed in Europe (Eger & Valdez, 2015). As a result of this, neo-
nationalism is better understood as a “boundary-maintenance project” rather than a 
“nation-building project” (Eger & Valdez, 2015, 127). Eger and Valdez argue, “neo-
nationalism occurs in a context in which boundaries have been settled, are widely 
accepted both internally (nationally) and externally (internationally), but are perceived to 
be under threat” (Eger & Valdez, 2015, 127). Neo-nationalism is a boundary-
maintenance project in that it is centered on the idea of defending the structure, 
sovereignty, identity and other significant elements of the nation-state from what ever is 
perceived to be threatening it.  
 In terms of their political platforms, the most significant shift in these former 
radical right parties is their abandonment of right-wing economic agendas between 1996 
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and 2010 (Eger & Valdez, 2015). According to their research, when these parties’ 
economic and social stances are looked at separately, it becomes evident that these 
parties are more economically left leaning than conservatives (Eger & Valdez, 2015). 
This leftward shift is exemplified by these parties’ support of welfare chauvinism, rather 
than cutting welfare programs. Moreover, in terms of ideology, they find that the most 
significant change that occurred was their greater emphasis on nationalist claims. 
According to their data, these parties have become more socially conservative over the 
years, which suggests “it is these parties’ stances on social issues that pull them 
towards the right-wing margin of the political spectrum” (Eger & Valdez, 2015, p. 121). 
This is evident in contemporary parties’ opposition to multiculturalism and their 
promotion of xenophobic anti-immigrant policy.  
 While these may appear to be two conflicting shifts, Eger and Valdez argue that 
they are rather compatible, as these parties possess a strong desire to defend their 
nation, which includes its welfare system. “Individuals who possess a strong sense of 
identity with their national community, and who are attached to its exclusionary norms 
and/or to its political institutions, will perceive their weakening as a loss” (Eger & Valdez, 
2015, p. 126-127). Moreover, Eger and Valdez argue that the term neo-nationalism 
correctly identifies contemporary radical right parties because it explicitly classifies them 
as a group of parties with nationalist ideology while also distinguishing them from right 
wing populist parties. Historically, for right wing populist parties, economic concerns 
were central to their agenda (Eger & Valdez, 2015). However, “for neo-national parties, 
nationalism is the primary political concern” (Eger & Valdez, 2015, 128). As a result, 
these parties tend to overlap with both far right and left wing values. While they share 
common ideological characteristics with the right, such as an emphasis on returning to 
traditional values and law and order, their economic ideology has changed. Moreover, 
while they share far left anti-establishment populism, disdain for supranational 
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organization as well as support for social welfare programs, they remain distinct from 
left-leaning parties due to their nationalist desire to protect and increase the benefits of 
ethno-nationals while simultaneously cutting benefits for foreigners (Eger & Valdez, 
2015). From these distinctions, it is evident that the central basis for neo-nationalist 
parties is not an adherence to rightist or the leftist beliefs, but rather to whatever the 
party sees as promoting and defending the nation and national identity; thus, directly 
informing these parties’ political, economic, and social agendas.    
 Eger and Valdez’s definition of neo-nationalism generally agrees with the 
definition proposed by Gingrich and Banks. Both argue that neo-nationalist parties are 
largely populist, anti-EU, anti-immigration, xenophobic, and focused on restoring society 
to what it used to be. However, Gingrich and Banks tend to focus more on the impact of 
globalization on neo-nationalism. While, Eger and Valdez agree with Gingrich and 
Banks’ emphasis on the globalized context in which neo-nationalism exists within, they 
also elaborate on the role of the nation-state system on this new form of nationalism. 
When examining the ideology of the FN, it becomes evident that this party best aligns 
with both Gingrich and Banks’ and Eger and Valdez’s definitions of neo-nationalism, as 
they are complementary. The FN’s platform reflects a strong sense of nationalism aimed 
at defending the French nation-state and corresponding national identity, as well as a 
strong discontent with globalization and the phenomenon that has result from it. This 
study seeks to contribute to this existing understanding of neo-nationalism by identifying 
where neo-nationalist parties locate their power and influence within society.  
Factors that have contributed to rise of the Front National in the 21st Century 
Economic: Global Crisis of 2008-09 
 The economy is the most common factors cited for contributing to the rise of the 
FN. Since the 2008-09 global recession, France’s economic state has been inconstant 
and unable to fully recover, as illustrated by their GDP (Figure 1) and unemployment 
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rates (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1: GDP (current US$) of France from 2007-2017. Adapted from GDP (current US$), n.s., 2017, 
World Bank. Retrieved March 17, 2019 from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&start=2007. Copyright 2019 by 
World Bank Group.   
 Since 2009 the GDP has continued to fluctuate, yet never fully returning to its 
peak level of 2008. However, in 2015 it reached an all-time low since the recession at 
2.438 trillion in 2015 (World Bank, n.d.). Since this low point, France’s GDP has been 
slowly increasing, making it to 2.583 in 2017 (World Bank, n.d.).  
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Figure 2: total unemployment rate (% of total labor force) in France (2007-2018). Adapted from 
“unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)”, international Labour 
Organization, ILOSTAT database, 2018, World Bank. Retrieved March 17, 2019 from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2018&locations=FR&start=2007. 
Copyright 2019 World Bank Group.  
 France’s total unemployment rate followed a similar pattern. Since the 2008 
recession unemployment has gradually continued to rise, peaking in 2015 at 10.36% (a 
record high since 1999) (World Bank, 2018). Since then, France’s rate of unemployment 
has been gradually declining, being at 8.812% in 2018 (World Bank, 2018).  
 During this economic instability in France, the Front National made significant 
gains in their electoral success. According to a study conducted by Manuel Funke, 
Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch, far right parties are the biggest beneficiaries 
of economic crises (2015). “In general, voting for far-right parties increases from about 
6% to about 10% following a financial crisis” (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015, p. 
14). Moreover, neo-nationalist and right-wing populist parties have benefited more in 
recent years than traditional extreme right parties, having more pronounced spikes in 
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electoral gains. As a result of these voting trends, fragmentation within the government 
increases, due to the strengthening of opposition forces, creating a weaker and less 
effective government (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015). These developments can 
hinder crisis resolution due to political polarization, therefore slowing down a country’s 
economic recovery to said crises.  
 Following the 2008 global recession, neo-nationalist and right-wing populist 
parties in Europe roughly doubled their vote shares, with the FN having the most 
significant over all electoral gains (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015). The party 
experienced an approximate 10% increase in votes in both departmental and legislative 
elections (between the 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 elections).11 In the 2012 presidential 
election, Le Pen almost doubled her vote share compared to her father’s 2007 election 
results (NSD, n.d.)12. Lastly, in the European parliament elections of 2014, the FN won 
the majority by achieving 24.86% of the vote, which allotted them 24 seats (out of 74) 
(European Parliament, 2014). Yet, in the previous elections of 2009, the party only won 
6.34% of the vote, ranking them in sixth place with only 4 seats in the parliament (NSD, 
n.d.).   
 Moreover, this correlation between electoral gains for the FN and the poor 
economic state in France becomes even more evident when comparing voting trends 
and unemployment in various regions of France.  
 
                                                        
11In the departmental elections of 2011, the FN won 15.06% of the vote whereas in 2008 the 
party only won 4.85% (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015). In the legislative elections of 2012, 
the FN won 13.60%, when in 2007 the party won 4.29% (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015).   
12 In 2012, Marine Le Pen won 17.90% (6,421,426 votes) in the first round, while in 2007 her 
father only acquired 10.44% (3,834,713 votes) (NSD, n.d.). 
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Figure 3: Unemployment rates by region. Adapted from “Taux de chômage par département” by n.s., 2017, Actualitix. 
Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://fr.actualitix.com/blog/taux-de-chomage-par-departement.html. Copyright 
2012 by Groups Articque Solutions. 
 In 2012 unemployment rates appeared to be the most severe towards the north, 
including: Somme Aisne (department 2; 13.83%) and Pas-de-Calais (department 62; 
12.79%), and towards the south of the France, including: Pyrénées-Orientales 
(department 66; 13.67%) and Hérault (department 34; 13.77%) (n.s., 2012) (See figure 
3). 
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Figure 4: FN 2012 presidential election results by region. Adapted from “ Les résultats électoraux du Front National 
by L. de Boissieu, 2015, France Politique. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from http://www.france-politique.fr/elections-
fn.htm. Copyright 2015 by Laurent de Boissieu pour France-politique.fr. 
 Based off the FN’s regional results in the 2012 presidential election (figure 4), the 
party appears to have higher electoral success in departments towards the north and 
south of France, mirroring the regions with high unemployment rates. Several 
departments that had some of the highest unemployment rates in the country, such as 
Pas-de-Calais (department 62; 25.53%), Aisne (department 2; 26.33%), and Vaucluse 
(department 84; 27.03%), also appeared to have voted the most for the FN (NSD, n.d.) 
Therefore, this comparison suggests that regions of high unemployment tend to be 
significant electoral bases for the FN. 
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Figure 5: Regional breakdowns of electoral results for Marine Le Pen and unemployment rates. Adapted from “How 
France Votes”, by G. Aisch, M. Bloch, K.R. Lai, and B. Morenne, 2017, New York Times. Retrieved March 3, 2019, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-election-results-maps.html. Copyright 
2017 by NYT.  
 The FN tends to gain votes in regions plagued by unemployment and economic 
turmoil (see figure 5). Following the 2008 Economic Crisis, departments in the north and 
south were hit the hardest. These regions already had higher unemployment rates and 
lower wages than other regions in France, as a result of historically being centers of 
traditional industrialized economic activities (which were already declining). However, 
the recession caused unemployment in these areas to rapidly increase and economic 
productivity to continue to decline at a faster rate. France’s economic crisis became 
particularly visible within these areas, heightening regional fears. Likewise, the lingering 
of this economic instability, as well as the French government’s inability to alleviate the 
situation, has not only intensified economic insecurities in the region, but has also made 
people fearful of globalization and neo-liberalism. It can be understood that the fear and 
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insecurities sparked by the 2008 economic crisis has boosted the appeal of the FN’s 
protectionist and exclusionary platform.  
Social: Changing Immigration Trends  
 The FN is arguably most well known for their strong anti-immigration stance that 
has been central to their ideology since it was founded. Around the same time that the 
FN made its first significant electoral gains in the 1980s, immigration trends in France 
were changing. Since the end of World War II, the number of immigrants in France has 
continued to increase.  
 
Figure 6: Percentage of immigrants in total French population. Adapted from “Les chiffres de l'immigration en 
France,” by A. Feetchak, 2018, Le Figaro. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2018/06/19/01016-20180619ARTFIG00310-les-chiffres-de-l-immigration-en-france.php. Copyright 2018 by 
Le Figaro.  
 According to the most recent data from 2014, immigrants make up 9.1% of the 
total French population (INSEE, 2018). Correspondingly, the demographics of 
immigration to France have also continued to change since World War II. Before and 
immediately following the war, Europeans used to be the dominant group immigrating to 
France. In 1946, immigrants from North Africa made up 2.3% of the total foreign 
population, while other populations, originating from European countries, accounted for 
88.7% (Stockemer, 2017). In 1962, European populations represented roughly 78.7% of 
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the foreign population, while immigrants from North Africa only represented 14.9% 
(Barou, 2014). However, for the rest of the 20th century the percentage of European 
immigrants moving to France continued to drop.  
 
Figure 7: Geographical origins of immigrants in France. Adapted from “Les chiffres de l'immigration en 
France” by A. Feetchak, 2018, Le Figaro. Retrieved March 17, 2019, from 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/06/19/01016-20180619ARTFIG00310-les-chiffres-de-l-
immigration-en-france.php. Copyright 2018 by Le Figaro.  
 In just twenty years the percentage of immigrants coming from Africa had more 
than doubled. In 1982 the European immigrant proportion of the French foreign 
population reduced to 56%, whereas the percentage of African immigrants (specifically 
from the Maghreb13) increased to 34% (Barou, 2014). Furthermore, European 
immigration continued to decrease while African immigration continued to rapidly 
increase. In 2014, European immigrants made up 36.1% of the foreign population in 
France, while African immigrants made up 43.8% (INSEE, 2018).  
 As non-European immigrants, specifically those from predominantly Muslim 
countries, have become more visible, this has shifted the French public’s perspective on 
immigration. “One of the most common constructed threats to societal security… is 
immigration, which is viewed as something that can change the receiving society’s 
identity by shifting the composition of the population” (Alkopher, 2015, 431). Moreover, a 
                                                        
13 Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco; predominantly Muslim region. 
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study analyzing how immigration impacts voting for far right and far left parties in France, 
by the IFO Institute found that immigration increases support for French far right 
candidates (identified as the FN), with little to no impact on voting for far left candidates 
(Edo, Giesing, Öztunc, & Poutvaara, 2017).  “Looking at different immigrant groups 
shows that the increase in the electoral support for the far-right is driven by low educated 
immigrants from non-Western countries” (Edo, Giesing, Öztunc, & Poutvaara, 2017, 27). 
These researchers determine that this is largely a result of concerns over “compositional 
amenities”, or concerns regarding the population composition of the receiving country in 
regards to religion, race, ethnicity, culture, etc. 
 Surveys over the past three years in France and Europe reflect this, indicating 
that the French public has a more negative attitude regarding immigration to France. The 
2016 Eurobarometer shows that the main concerns of the French are both immigration 
and terrorism (Eurobarometer, 2016). The 2017 Special Eurobarometer reports that 
there is a disconnection between the French public’s perception of the size of the 
immigrant population and its actual size. Twenty-one percent of French people 
estimated that immigrants made up between 12% and 25% of the total population in 
France (Eurobarometer, 2017). The average respondent estimated that the proportion of 
immigrants in the country was at 18.1%, while in 2017, immigrants only comprised 8.9% 
of the total French population (Eurobarometer, 2017). Additionally, this survey showed 
that the majority of the French population sees immigration from outside the EU as a 
problem for France, rather than as an opportunity (Eurobarometer, 2017). Thirty-eight 
percent of French people stated that it was a problem, 32% said that it was both, and 
only 17% said it was more of an opportunity (Eurobarometer, 2017). Lastly, a survey 
done by Chatham House, the Institute of International Affairs did a poll in 2017 asking 
10,000 people from 10 different European countries if “all migration from mainly Muslim 
countries should be stopped”. Sixty-one percent of French people surveyed agreed that 
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immigration from Muslim countries should be stopped, 23% said neither agree nor 
disagree, and only 16% said that they disagree (Chatham House, 2017). Furthermore, 
this data indicates that a significant portion of the French population sees rising 
immigration rates and the increasing presence of non-European, specifically Muslim 
immigrants as a problem and/or threat to the “compositional” wellbeing of the country.  
 This transition has benefitted the FN by strengthening the appeal of their anti-
immigration message. This becomes significantly more evident when comparing the 
geographic location of immigrations in France (figure 8) and regions where the FN 
preforms well in elections (figure 9). A study looking at how immigration size impacts 
voting for the FN, conducted by Daniel Della Posa, asserts that on the regional level, the 
two are strongly connected. Posa’s research determined that immigrant population size 
has a positive relation with FN voting on the regional level and a negative relation on the 
commune level (Della Posa, 2013). Yet, “department etranger population’s positive 
association with [FN] voting is considerably stronger in magnitude than commune 
etranger population’s counteracting negative association” (Della Posa, 2013, 269-270). 
Thus, in other words, the FN-suppressing effects of the commune level are not strong 
enough to negate the positive electoral effects of the regional level on the FN.  
  
Figure 8: Geographic distribution of immigrants. Adapted 
from “La localisation géographique des immigrés”, by C. 
Brutel, 2016, INSEE: Institut national de la statistique et des 
études économique. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from 
https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2121524. Copyright 
2016 by INSEE.  
Figure 9: FN 2012 presidential election results by region. Adapted from “ 
Les résultats électoraux du Front National by L. de Boissieu, 2015, France 
Politique. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from http://www.france-
politique.fr/elections-fn.htm. Copyright 2015 by Laurent de Boissieu pour 
France-politique.fr. 
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  In conjunction with Della Posa’s study, these results indicate that there is a 
correlation between voter support for the FN on a regional level and large immigrant 
populations in the South of France. This is predominately true in Southern France, 
where immigration appears to be the highest (outside of Paris). In a poll conducted by Le 
Monde in 2013 that interviewed voters specifically from the South of France, 97% of 
them emphasized that “il y a trop d’immigrés en France”14 and 85% of them stated “ je 
ne me sent plus en sécurité”15 (Mestre, 2013). 
 These southern regions, with increasing non-European immigrant populations, 
have become a center for reactionary anti-immigration attitudes because most of the 
French see these changing immigration trends as a visible threat, legitimizing the anti-
immigration rhetoric of the FN from the perspective of southern voters and creating a 
strong regional voter base for the party.   
Political: The Sarkozy and Hollande Presidencies   
A. The Sarkozy Administration (2007-2012)  
 Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in integrating the FN ideology into 
mainstream politics in two notable ways. First, Sarkozy largely legitimized and 
normalized the FN’s platform. Throughout his 2007 and 2012 presidential campaigns, as 
well as during his presidency, Sarkozy capitalized on the rhetoric of the FN in order to 
attract the support of Le Pen’s electorate. While he is not the first mainstream politician 
to embrace neo-nationalist tendencies in order to get elected into office. Sarkozy is seen 
as a central figure for this legitimization of the FN’s ideas since no other politicians had 
                                                        
14 Translation: “there are too many immigrants in France.” 
 
15 Translation: “I no longer feel safe.” 
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made use of this rhetoric “in such a persistent and open manner [as he has]” (Mondon, 
2013, 29).  
 Most evident was Sarkozy’s appropriation of the FN’s populist, exclusionary, and 
apocalyptic/fear-based language. Sarkozy promoted himself as ‘the voice of the people’ 
yet used strategic language to create his own exclusionary version of ‘the people’. “He 
emphasized the division between those who worked hard and those who did not; those 
who deserved help, empathy and sympathy, and those who were responsible for their 
exclusion; those who worked hard to be French and those who did not and should leave” 
(Mondon, 2013, 31). He fabricated a polarizing narrative that positioned the French 
public (‘the people”) against a common, “threatening” enemy (the corrupted elites, the 
left, Muslims, “non-assimilated” immigrants). Furthermore, similarly to Le Pen, Sarkozy 
then used this “enemy” as a scapegoat for the problems in France (Mayaffre & Scholz, 
2017).  
  During his campaign for the 2007 presidential election, Sarkozy made the claim 
that France was experiencing a crisis of national identity. He argued, “Our republican 
model is in crisis. This crisis is first and foremost a moral crisis…a crisis of values, a 
crisis of landmarks, a crisis of meaning, a crisis of identity. The denigration of the nation 
is at the heart of this crisis” (Mondon, 2013, 33). He argued that people had stopped 
being proud of their Frenchness and that if he was elected, he would revitalize the 
French identity (Mondon, 2014). In doing so, Sarkozy was not attempting to address 
systemic failures or problems within the French state (Mondon, 2013). Rather, he was 
fostering fear and promoting the FN’s exclusionary conception of French identity, in 
which those who were “deviant” from traditional French culture became the “Other” and 
were portrayed as responsible for this crisis. He, therefore, fabricated connections 
between immigration and this crisis of identity as well as immigration and security.  
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 In order to avoid being labeled as racist, Sarkozy’s rhetoric promoted a 
dichotomy that shifted the focus from heredity (who has French blood) to integration 
(who is compatible with French culture). Consequently, this divided immigrants into two 
groups: those who deserved to become French (immigrants who came legally and had 
assimilated into French society) and those who did not (immigrants who had come 
illegally and/or appeared to be holding on to their original culture) (Mondon, 2013). This 
second group, which more often than not was depicted as the Muslim community, was 
accused of taking advantage of France by stealing social services, jobs, housing, and 
money that rightfully belonged to French citizens; therefore being a threat to the financial 
and economic wellbeing of France. Additionally, their portrayed incompatibility with 
French values was also perceived as a threat to the preservation and longevity of 
French culture. 
 After Sarkozy won the presidential election of 2007 and entered into office, his 
rhetoric and actions continued to match the discourse of the FN. He restricted 
immigration laws and significantly reduced the rights of immigrants, arguing that in doing 
so it would improve the state of France (Gastaut, 2012). However, he continued to use 
these populations as scapegoats and specifically targeted the Muslim community. In 
2009 Sarkozy declared,  “the burqa is not welcome on the Republic’s territory. It does 
not fit with the Republican concept of the dignity of women’’ (Gastaut, 2012, 339). 
Subsequently in 2010, Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public 
(the law prohibiting concealment of the face in public space) was passed in the Senate, 
prohibiting women from wearing veils and attire that covers the face in public (such as 
the burqa and niqab), which can been seen largely as a tool to specifically discriminate 
against Muslims (Gastaut, 2012). Moreover, this discrimination continued in 2011 as 
Sarkozy outlawed street prayers, originally Le Pen’s idea (Vinocur, 2011). However, this 
was a clear, strategic attempt by Sarkozy to attract the FN’s electorate to his side for the 
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2012 presidential election, as he had done in 2007. Moreover, in an interview in 2012, 
Sarkozy solidified the FN’s normalization even more by stating that Marine Le Pen’s FN 
was a “democratic party” and that their values were “in accordance with the values of the 
Republic” (Mondon 2014, 311). However, by the election in 2012, Sarkozy’s use of the 
FN’s rhetoric had altered how people perceived Le Pen and her party, making the FN’s 
rhetoric and platform “widely accepted as part of the political establishment, clear of 
stigma” (Mondon, 2013, 38). 
 Second, Sarkozy’s other main contribution to the rise of the FN is that his 
presidency furthered the French public’s distrust for the traditional political parties. 
Figure 10 shows Sarkozy’s popularity ratings throughout his presidency (2007-2012).  
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Figure 10: Nicolas Sarkozy’s approval ratings (2007-2012). Adapted from “Cote de confiance - Nicolas 
Sarkozy” by Baromètre Kantar TNS / Figaro-Magazine, n.d., Kantar TNS. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from 
https://www.tns-sofres.com/dataviz?code_nom=sarkozy&type=1. Copyright 2019 by Kantar TNS.   
 Sarkozy remained the most popular at the beginning of his presidency (see figure 
10). In July 2007, 65% of the French population expressed having confidence in the new 
president, while only 34% did not (Kantar TNS). A year later this had drastically 
changed. In July 2008 only 33% of the French population expressed having confidence 
in Sarkozy, while 65% expressed having no confidence (Kantar TNS). His approval 
ratings wavered throughout his presidency, slightly increasing and decreasing, but never 
going above 41% (Kantar TNS). By the end of his presidency, only 37% of the public 
expressed having confidence in him, while 60% disapproved of him (Kantar TNS).  
 This data demonstrates the French public’s lack of trust in Sarkozy. His 
presidency revealed that there were inconsistencies between his actions/policies and 
what he had promised during his campaign. When elected Sarkozy vowed to transform 
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France in a way that would benefit the poor, those who felt scorned by globalization, and 
those who felt neglected by the traditional French parties. Yet, during his presidency 
there was little to no economic growth, tax reforms were passed that benefitted the elite, 
unemployment skyrocketed, government spending was cut, purchasing power was 
diminished and France lost its AAA credit rating (Erlanger, 2012; Chrisafis, 2012). Many 
of the people he initially claimed to represent were worse off following his time in office. 
Despite the impacts of the Global Economic Crisis, it was clear that in general his 
actions fell short of his campaign promises (Gastaut, 2012). Sarkozy’s emphasis on 
security, immigration, and identity generated more fear and insecurity in France, but his 
policies (such tightening of immigration) did not ameliorate the condition of the French 
state.  
 The public’s dissatisfaction with Sarkozy, undoubtedly unfolded as dissatisfaction 
and distrust for his party, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP): 
Presidential unpopularity translated into electoral defeats for the UMP. 
The least poor result was that of the 2009 European elections, when the 
center-left’s vote split between Socialists and Greens and made the 
UMP’s 27.8% look respectable. But at the municipal elections of March 
2008, the regionals of March 2010, and the cantonales of 2011, the UMP 
lost ground. [As a result of this] some UMP candidates, indeed, avoided 
association with the president” (Knapp, 2013, p. 440-441). 
 This unpopularity and division within the UMP largely favored the FN in two 
significant ways. First, electoral defeat and internal turmoil, due, in part, to public 
dissatisfaction with the Sarkozy, resulted in the UMP dissolving in 2015. Following 
Sarkozy’s loss in the 2012 presidential election, his reputation had severely been 
smeared and French voters had largely disregarded the UMP. As the UMP had been a 
significant competitor for the FN in elections, its fall aided the neo-nationalist party by 
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making it the central contender for the right-wing electorate (Mondon, 2013). Second, it 
augmented anti-establishment sentiments and distrust of traditional right-wing parties. 
Sarkozy’s presidency communicated to the public that dominant/mainstream right-wing 
parties, such as the UMP, were unable to effectively address the problems plaguing 
France because they were part of the problem. This furthered the appeal that the FN 
was the alternative party France needed in order to be “restored”.  
B. The Hollande Administration (2012-2017) 
 In response to Sarkozy’s presidency, the French public gravitated to the other 
side of the political spectrum, electing François Hollande (leader of the Parti Socialist 
(PS)) as president in 2012. Sarkozy’s presidency communicated to the public that the 
French traditional right parties were unable to address the problems facing the French. It 
can be assumed that France elected Hollande with the hopes that the traditional left 
would be able to do what the traditional right could not.  
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Figure 11: François Hollande’s approval ratings (mid-2012 to 2017). Adapted from “Cote de confiance - 
François Hollande”, Baromètre Kantar TNS / Figaro-Magazine, n.d., Kantar TNS. Retrieved March 15, 
2019 from https://www.tns-sofres.com/dataviz?type=1&code_nom=hollande. Copyright 2019 by Kantar 
TNS.  
 Just after taking office, Hollande had an approval rating of 61% (Kuhn, 2014). 
However, by the end 2012, this had drastically changed (figure 11). For the rest of his 
presidency, Hollande had particularly low approval ratings, remaining below 30% from 
2013 to mid-2015 (Kantar TNS). His ratings only improved in November 2015, following 
the terrorist attack in Paris, increasing to 35% in December of that year (Kantar TNS). By 
February 2016, however, his ratings had dropped again: 15% of the French public 
expressed having confidence in Hollande, while an overwhelming 82% expressed 
dissatisfaction (Kantar TNS).  
 Hollande’s unpopularity is attributed to his inability to uphold his campaign 
promises, specifically regarding unemployment and economic growth, during his time in 
office.  
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Hollande came to power at a time when the French economy was 
performing poorly, as evidenced by low levels of economic growth (0.3% 
in 2012, 0.3% in 2013 and 0% in each of the first two quarters of 2014)—
compared with 2.4 % in 2007, the year in which Sarkozy came to power. 
Public debt has also increased: 90.6% of GDP by the end of 2012 and 
93.5% by the end of 2013—compared with 63.2% at the end of 2007 
(Kuhn, 2014, p. 441). 
 As a result of this economic background, Hollande was unable to reduce the 
unemployment rate. When Hollande came into office unemployment was at 9.7% (Kuhn, 
2014). The unemployment rate continued to skyrocket throughout the course of his 
presidency, peaking in 2015 at 10.39% (World Bank, 2018). The economy of France 
continued to remain in crisis, making Hollande appear ineffective and useless:  
“Despite several policy measures to try and aid those seeking work, 
specifically the youth, the president’s pledge on employment could not 
be achieved because a sufficiently high level of economic growth (it is 
generally agreed that around 1.5% is required to have an impact on 
employment) was not forthcoming” (Kuhn, 2014, p. 441).  
 Populations hit the hardest by this economic instability were those of low 
education levels and skills – specifically those working manufacturing jobs (Kuhn, 2014). 
Yet, this portion of the population was traditionally the main electorate of the PS (Kuhn, 
2014). Furthermore, as a result of Hollande’s presidency, people lost trust in the left, 
exemplified by Benoît Hamon, the PS candidate in the 2017 presidential election.16 
Betrayed by Sarkozy (UMP) and then Hollande (PS), it became clearer from the 
perspective of the public that these traditional parties were no longer able to address the 
                                                        
16 Hamon was the PS candidate in the 2017 presidential election and was unable to make to the 
second round of voting. As already stated, the PS has been one of the two major parties in 
France since the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Moreover, the fact that Hamon, as the PS 
candidate, was unable to make it to the second round of voting in indicative of the party’s loss of 
support.   
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needs and concerns of the French people. Hereby strengthened the appeal of the FN as 
an alternative party, neither for the left nor the right, but rather for the French. 
Discussion and analysis of interactions  
 Separately, each of these transformations benefited the FN, as each presented 
an economic, social, and political justification for supporting the party. However, by 
examining how these transformations interacted and intersected with one another, it 
provides a more holistic understanding of how these transformations strengthened the 
rise of the FN.  
The economic recession of 2008 strengthened the appeal of the FN’s protectionist 
approach, particularly in regions with high unemployment and low economic growth. 
Rising immigration rates and the increasing presence of non-European, specifically 
Muslim immigrants complemented this protectionist stance because it reinforced the 
FN’s claim that there is a connection between immigration and unemployment. Sarkozy, 
through his appropriation of the FN’s rhetoric, asserted that there was also a relationship 
between immigration, security, and national identity. Thus, normalizing the FN’s rhetoric 
and ideology. Moreover, the economic recession of 2008, and its lasting grip on the 
French economy/unemployment, greatly contributed to the public’s dissatisfaction with 
both Sarkozy and Hollande, thus indirectly strengthening anti-establishment sentiments 
and reinforcing the appeal of the FN as an ‘alternative’ political party.   
 Above all else these factors demonstrate how the FN benefits from crisis and 
fear. The rhetoric surrounding these transformations communicates to the French public 
that their country is in a state of “crisis”: an economic crisis, an identity/security crisis, 
and a political crisis. The FN’s platform underscores this, promoting the idea that the 
French state has been weakened and made vulnerable by the globalized world (as well 
as the missteps of past presidential administrations). Moreover, these crisis translate 
into fears: the fear of another global recession; the fear that French culture is being 
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threatened by the presence of “incompatible” cultures and religions; and the fear that the 
French government is ineffective and unable to tackle these “crises”, thus resulting in 
their permanency. Consequently, when people are afraid for their safety and wellbeing 
they are drawn to what they believe is going to protect them. The FN has built their 
image around la préférence nationale and the idea that they prioritize and protect the 
wellbeing of the French people. The FN thrives and gains power/influence in times of 
heightened instability and crises in society because fear of difference (and what could 
result of it) is the basis of their ideology. This is exemplified by how the FN tends to win 
the most votes in regions with high unemployment, low economic growth, and/or large 
immigrant populations, because these are the areas where these ‘crises’ are the most 
visible. Furthermore, this is, in part, what distinguishes the FN from other extremist 
groups: the Front National is strategic, adaptive and during times of crisis, when chaos 
ensues, it is at its strongest.   
Conclusion 
  This paper identified how the 2008-09 Global Economic crisis, shifting and 
increasing immigration trends, and the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François 
Hollande interacted with one another to strengthen the rise of the French neo-nationalist 
party, the Front National. Ultimately, these transformations collectively support the notion 
that France is in a state of crisis, requiring an alternative party to take power, therefore 
bolstering the appeal of the FN.  
 It is important to note the limitations of this analysis. Realistically, there are a 
number of other transformations that have contributed to the success of FN that have 
not been covered in this paper, such as how other French politicians (besides Sarkozy 
and Hollande) have normalized and legitimized the values/beliefs of the party or the way 
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la laïcité17 is implemented in France. Additionally, this analysis and understanding of 
how these transformations interact is also limited in this paper. Moreover, this analysis is 
not meant to be limiting or to provide a relatively simple explanation for a very complex 
situation. Rather, it is meant to contribute to a general gap in research regarding how 
multiple transformations have collectively bolstered the popularity of the FN and it is 
meant to be a starting point from which other researchers may build. 
 Following Macron’s victory in the 2017 election, many assumed that this 
symbolized the end of the FN. It represented that France was willing to try new 
‘alternatives’ to traditional political parties (i.e. Macron’s centrist political platform), rather 
than accepting the exclusionary neo-nationalist platform of the FN. However, Le Pen’s 
loss did not mean that the FN was finished in French politics, nor did it symbolize a 
much larger rejection of neo-nationalism around the world.  During this election Le Pen 
won a historical amount of votes for her party. Moreover, since 2017, other neo-
nationalist politicians have made instrumental gains in their own countries, such as Jair 
Bolsonaro winning the 2018 presidential election or Matteo Salvini serving as Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Italy since mid-2018. In the recent 2019 
European Parliament elections, neo-nationalist parties made headlines not only because 
there was a historic number of these parties on ballots, but also because of their 
electoral results: The Front National, the League (Italy), the Freedom Party (Austria), the 
Swedish Democrats (Sweden), the National Alliance (Latvia), the Alternative for 
Germany, and several others all winning majorities within their respective countries 
(Damgé & Breteau, 2019).18  
                                                        
17 In simple terms, la laïcité is the French conception of secularism.  
18 The FN won 23.3% of votes, the League won 34.3%, the Freedom Party won 17.2%, the 
Swedish Democrats won 15.4%, the National Alliance won 16.4%, and the Alternative for 
Germany won 11%.  
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 Arguably now more than ever it is important to understand where the support and 
power of the FN comes from as it not only provides powerful insights about other neo-
nationalists parties but is also important for the future of France. Since his inauguration 
in 2017, Macron and his policies have remained particularly unpopular, as indicated 
most recently by Mouvement des gilets jaunes (yellow vests movement), which calls for 
his resignation among other demands. The general dissatisfaction in France regarding 
Macron, among people who did not vote for him as well as those who did, could mean 
that Le Pen and her party are seen as the best option for the French presidential election 
of 2022.  
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